Abstract. As far as we know, the literature on secure computation from cut-and-choose has focused on achieving computational security against malicious adversaries. It is unclear whether the idea of cut-andchoose can be adapted to secure computation with information-theoretic security. In this work we explore the possibility of using cut-and-choose in information theoretic setting for secure three-party computation (3PC). Previous work on 3PC has mainly focus on the semi-honest case, and is motivated by the observation that real-word deployments of multi-party computation (MPC) seem to involve few parties. We propose a new protocol for information-theoretically secure 3PC tolerating one malicious party with cheating probability 2 −s using s runs of circuit computation in the cut-and-choose paradigm. The computational cost of our protocol is essentially only a small constant worse than that of state-of-the-art 3PC protocols against a semi-honest corruption, while its communication round is greatly reduced compared to other maliciously secure 3PC protocols in information-theoretic setting.
Introduction
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set of parties to compute a function of their joint inputs without revealing anything beyond the fuction output. During the past few years, a tremendous amount of attention has been devoted to making MPC practical, such as [HEKM11] [KSS13] . However, most of such works have focused on secure two-party computation (2PC). In the semi-honest setting, it has been shown that Yao's garbled circuit technique [Yao86] can yield very efficent protocols for the computation of boolean circuits [BDNP08,HSS + 10,HEKM11,HEK12]. In the malicious setting, the cut-andchoose technique [LP07] based on Yao's garbled circuit was used to construct efficient, constant-round protocols. This technique was further developed in a large body of subsequent work [Woo07,LPS08,NO09,S + 11,LP12,KSS12,HKE13] [Lin13,MR13,S
+ 13], yielding the fastest protocols for 2PC of Boolean circuits. Recently, Yao's garbled circuits are also applied to constructing secure threeparty computation (3PC) against malicious corruptions, with [CKMZ14] and without [MRZ15] the cut-and-choose technique. It appears that the cut-andchoose technique is naturally used with Yao's garbled circuits. It is unknown so far if this idea can be applied to the information-theoretic setting.
Secure three-party computation (3PC) where only one party is corrupted (honest majority) is an important special case where the least number of parties is satisfied for achieving information-theoretic security. In this setting, protocols designed with semi-honest security can be significantly more efficient than their two-party counterparts since they are commonly based on secret sharing schemes instead of cryptographic operations. To achieve security against malicious adversaries, usually verifiable secret sharing is used, resulting significant communication complexity and overhead. Existing work includes implementation and optimization in frameworks such as Sharemind [BLW08], ShareMonad [LDDAM12, LADM14] .
Our Contribution
We design a new protocol for 3PC with one malicious corruption from cut-andchoose in the information-theoretic setting. Unlike the standard approach of applying cut-and-choose technique for compiling GC-based protocols into malicious 2PC, we show that in the setting of information-theoretically secure 3PC with one corruption one can also use the cut-and-choose paradigm and achieve malicious security at a cost similar to semi-honest 3PC constructions.
The communication complexity of our protocol is linear to the depth of the circuit, just as that of the common methods of information theoretically secure computations (e.g., the verifiable secret sharing methods). However, through the application of cut-and-choose, we can significantly reduce the communication rounds greatly, comparied with the normal methods from verifiable secret sharing.
In practical applications, our protocol can be converted into one against convert adversaries [Lin13] by fixing the statsitcal parameter s at a small value, yeilding a faster protocol. For example, if the covert securlty level, where the protocol ensures that 99.5% of cheats are caught, is sufficient for practical application, then fixing s = 8 is good, and the protocol is secure in the presence of convert adversaries with deterrent = 1 − 2 −8 .
Overview of Our Protocol
The high-level idea of our construction is to execute the three-party protocol against semi-honest adversaries s times in parallel. The transcripts of r randomly selected runs are revealed for verifying the correctness of computation (i.e., computation verification), while the remaining s − r runs are used for computing the output (i.e., output computation). This is a classical cut-and-choose paradigm. However, to achieve malicious security, there are two challenges as follows. First, the randomly selected runs for computation verification should not use the true input of each party, while those for output computation should. Otherwise, the privacy and/or correctness of the protocol would be violated.
Meanwhile, the selection randomness (for using true inputs or not) should be unknown to any participant party, but can be determined cooperatively by all the three parties. The reason is that if any party knows this randomness, it can easily make modification to the output computation runs without being caught in the cut-and-choose process.
To address the first challenge, in our protocol, we let each party prepare two versions of input: one is the true input and the other is a random input (i.e., a randomly selected string of the same bit length as the true input). Next, let each party make s copies of its input, with its two versions of input randomly permuted in each copy. A well-designed circuit is then used to select a proper input according to a cut-and-choose indicator c for each run. Specifically, if the jth bit of c is 1, then the true input is selected; otherwise, the random input is selected (see Fig. 1 ). In order to address the second challenge, the permutation randomness of the two input versions of each party is privately generated, and unknown to any other party. Thus, the shared inputs cannot be altered, without being detected, by any party except its owner. This prevents the malicious party from tampering the inputs without being caught. Additionally, the cut-and-choose indicator c is generated by the three parties in a way such that, no individual party knows anything about c, but all of them can determine c cooperatively. This ensures that any party cannot determine whether a given run is used for computation verification or output computation and thus cannot falsify the circuit computation without being caught.
Construction
In Section 2, some preliminary topics including the circuit notation, secret sharing, security model are described. In Section 3, the underlying 3PC against semi-honest adversaries is introduced. Our maliciously secure 3PC from cut-andchoose is detailed and analyzed in Section 4. Then, some practical considerations of our protocol is mensioned in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 is the conclusion of our work.
Preliminaries
We let s denote the statistical security parameter, and assume that the computed function is represented exclusively with XOR and AND gates.
Circuit Notation
We follow the circuit notation in [BHR12] . Denote a circuit C = (n, m, q, F, S, G), where n and m are the numbers of input and output wires, respectively, q is the number of gates, and each gate is indexed by its output wire. Obviously, the total number of wires in the circuit is n + q. Let the wire numbering start with input wires and end with output wires, then the input wires are {1, · · · , n} and the output wires are {n + q − m + 1, · · · , n + q}. The function F (resp., S) takes as input a gate index and returns the first (resp., second) input wire to gate, with a constraint F (g) < S(g) < g for any gate index g. The function G represents the operation of a given gate, e.g., G g (0, 1) = 1 if the gate with index g is an XOR gate. Since we consider circuits with inputs from three parties, let {n i−1 + 1, · · · , n i } denote the input wires of party P i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, with n 0 = 0 and n 3 = n.
XOR Secret Sharing
Our constructions use three-out-of-three XOR secret sharing: the secret x ∈ {0, 1} k is split into three random shares x 1 , x 2 and x 3 ∈ {0, 1} k such that x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ x 3 = x, with P i holding share x i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We denote a share of x by [x] i = x i and the sharing by 
It is straight-forward to show that the above secret sharing scheme is information theoretically secure given that the shares x 1 , x 2 and x 3 are uniformly chosen (subject to x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ x 3 = x). Reconstructing a sharing [x] is easily done by having each party P i announce his share [x] i and taking
Shamir's Secret Sharing
Shamir's secret sharing [Sha79] is a fundamental (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme. The related notions are described as follows.
(t, n)-threshold secret sharing. A secret s is dispersed into n shares in such a way that any k ≤ t shares give no information on s (i.e., t-privacy), whereas any k ≥ t + 1 shares uniquely determine s (i.e., (t + 1)-reconstruction), where t, n are integers with 0 ≤ t < n.
In (t, n)-threshold secret sharing, if an adversary obtains at most t shares, he obtains nothing about the secret. One of the widely used (t, n)-threshold secret sharing schemes is Shamir's defined as follows.
Shamir's (t, n)-threshold Secret Sharing. Let p > n be a prime. Given integers t, n with 0 ≤ t < n, and α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n ∈ F p being pairwise distinct and non-zero. Note that p, t, n, α 1 , α 2 , ..., α n are public data. Denote the secret by s ∈ F p . Select a polynomial f (x) ∈ F p [X] uniformly at random, conditioned on deg(f ) ≤ t and f (0) = s. The n shares in the secret s are then given as follows:
It is proved that Shamir's secret sharing satisfies t-privacy and (t + 1)-reconstruction with t + 1 ≤ n.
Reconstruction of Shamir's Secret Sharing. Given a set of shares corresonding to C ⊂ {α i |1 ≤ i < n} with |C| = t + 1, the reconstruction of s is as follows.
First, the polynomial f (x) over F is reconstructed using Lagrange interpolation.
f
where θ i (x) is the degree t polynomial such that, for all i, j ∈ C, θ i (α j ) = 0 if i = j and θ i (α j ) = 1 if i = j, namely,
Then, s is the output of function f (x) at x = 0, namely s = f (0).
Universally Composable (UC) Security
The framework of UC security involves a collection of interactive Turing machines, and security is defined by comparing a real and ideal interaction among these machines. In the real interaction, parties cooperatively run a protocol, while an adversary may corrupt a part of parties. In the ideal interaction, parties run a dummy protocol by sending inputs to and receiving outputs from an uncorruptable functionality machine, which performs the entire computation on behalf of the parties. An environment machine is introduced to both real and ideal interactions, representing anything external to the current protocol execution. The environment provides all inputs to all parties and reads all outputs from them, and can also interact arbitrarily with the adversary (resp. simulator ) in the real (resp. ideal) interaction. Security means that the environment cannot distinguish the real and ideal interactions. At the end of interaction, the environment output a bit. Let REAL[Z, A, π] and IDEAL[Z, S, F] denote the output of the environment Z when interacting with adversary A and parties who execute protocol π, and when interacting with simulator S and parties run the dummy protocol in the presence of functionality F, respectively. We say that protocol π is informationtheoretically secure if for every adversary A with unbounded computation power attacking the real interaction, there exists a simulator S attacking the ideal interaction, such that for all environments Z, Eq. (3) holds with negligible exception.
Particularly, we say that perfect security is achieved, or the real view is perfectly simulated if Eq. (3) holds.
3PC in Semi-honest Setting
We use as a basis a 3PC protocol against semi-honest adversaries, a variant of
Denote the bit value of wire w by δ(w), and the k-bit string value of wire w by δ k (w). The detailed protocol of the variant ITSEC is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
Theorem 1 states the security of the 3PC protocol π sem 3PC (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ) in the semi-honest setting. Theorem 1. Protocol π sem 3PC (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ) is information-theoretically secure in the presence of a semi-honest adversary corrupting one party.
Proof. Since in protocol π sem 3PC (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ), the three parties are symmetric, we only need to prove the case where one of the parties is corrupted.
Specifically, we show that for every adversary with unbounded computation power, the environment's real view based on the interaction with the adversary and the parties executing the protocol is indistinguishable to the environment's simulated view based on the interaction with a simulator and the the parties calling the functionality.
Without loss of generality, we assume that party P 1 is corrupted. For each phase of the protocol, we simulate the protocol execution as follows:
-Input sharing: Party P 1 receives [x 3 ] 1 from P 3 , and [x 2 ] 1 from P 2 . The two messages can be simulated by two uniformly random bit strings s 1 ∈ {0, 1} |x3| and s 2 ∈ {0, 1} |x2| , resulting that both real and simulated views are identical. Input: Party Pi holds input xi ∈ {0, 1} n i −n i−1 with i ∈ {1, 2, 3} Auxiliary Inputs: Circuit C = (n, m, q, F, S, G) containing exclusively XOR and AND gates 1. Input sharing:
-For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
-If g is AND gate (see Fig. 3 ): For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
Fig. 2. ITSEC Variant 3PC Protocol 
, 2, 3}. Note that this communication pattern uses no broadcast channels.
-Circuit computation: This phase can be simulated gate by gate until the circuit computation is completed. Given a current gate, it is simulated in terms of its operation as follows.
• XOR: Party P 1 sends or receives nothing, so there is nothing to be simulated.
• AND: Let a and b denote the two input bits to the gate. During the gate computation, P 1 receives [a] 3 , [b] 3 and r 3 from P 3 . From the circuit computation of the protocol, it is clear that bit shares
are independent uniformly random bits merely subject to a = ⊕
m .
In all phases, we can see that both real and simulated views are identical. We thus conclude that Protocol π sem 3PC is information-theoretically secure against semihonest adversaries corrupting one party.
Three-Party Computation from Cut-and-Choose
In this section, we compile the 3PC protocol against semi-honest adversaries introduced in the previous section into a maliciously secure protocol using the cut-and-choose paradigm. This is the first time of applying cut-and-choose idea to the information-theoretic setting as far as we know. Then, the security and efficiency of the proposed protocol is analyzed.
The Detailed Protocol
Our 3PC protocol with malicious security can be described in four phases, each of which is detailed as follows.
Input preparation. Each party P i (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) prepares a random input and its true input. That is, P i selects a random bit string x ) with permutation bit σ ij ∈ {0, 1}. In the copy I ij , if σ ij = 0, the true input x 0 i is placed in the first field; otherwise, it is placed in the second field. Let I i = (I i,1 , · · · , I i,s ) denote P i 's set of inputs, with a random permutation vector σ i = (σ i,1 , · · · , σ i,s ) chosen by P i . Note that this permutation vector is only know to the owner of the inputs, but unknown to other parties. This prevents other parties from modifying the true inputs but leaving the random inputs untouched.
Then, P i prepares the sharing of his input [
, and sends two of the shares to the other two parties, one for each party. After that, P i selects a random bit string c i = {0, 1}
s as a share of the cut-and-choose indicator c, i.e., [c] 
For commitment, we use scheme π com (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ) depicted in Fig. 4 in the whole paper unless noted otherwise. This commitment scheme is a three-party protocol and based on Shamir's secret sharing. It is of perfect hiding and perfect binding as we will show in Section 4.2. Furthermore, the scheme has other properties as follows. First, it is uncommitment-symmetric: in the commitment phase, one party (the committer) commits to the value, while in the uncommitment phase, any party can uncommit the committed value. Second, it is addition (substraction) homomorphic. That is, given commitments to a and b, it is easy for each party to locally compute the commitments to a+b and a−b by adding or substracting the corresponding shares. These two properties are straight-forward to verify.
Protocol πcom(P1, P2, P3)
Input: Pi holds a secret d ∈ {0, 1} k Auxiliary Inputs: Prime p > 3 and p > 2 k+1 ; Committer Pi, and verifiers P h(i+1) , P h(i+2) (i ∈ {1, 2, 3})
, and d h(i+2) to P h(i+2) 2. Uncommitment phase:
-For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}: Pi sends di to P h(i+1) and P h(i+2) -For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}: Pi receives d h(i+1) from P h(i+1) , and d h(i+2) from P h(i+2) -Verifiers P h(i+1) and P h(i+2) do the verification as follows, respectively: reconstruct d (1) from d1 and d2, d (2) from d2 and d3, d (3) from d3 and d1, and check whether d
( -Generate s copies of input sharing: for each run to select proper inputs using σ ij , I ij and c with i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {1, · · · , s}.
), we have
, where c (j) is the jth bit of c. For jth run, the input selection circuit can be designed as follows.
where x ij is the input of P i picked up using the cut-and-choose indicator in the jth run (i.e., if c (j) = 0 then x ij = x 0 i ; otherwise, x ij = x 1 i ). Plug Eqs. (4) and (5) into Eq. (6), we then get
Concatenating the circuit represented by Eq. (8) to the circuit of the computed function, the three parties can cooperatively decide the inputs (true or random) to each run, without any party knowing anything about the decision. Then, with each shared and decided copy of input, the three parties cooperatively compute the circuit of the computed function once. Each party records the transcripts (values of all the wires) of all the s runs.
Transcript commitment. Each party P k commits to the transcript of every run of the circuit. The transcript of a circuit C = (n, m, q, F, S, G) can be described with all its wire states by a string t ∈ {0, 1} n+q . We let P k stores its transcript in an array T [n k−1 + 1..n k ] and T j h(k+2) [n k−1 + 1..n k ] of each party P k 's input (selected in the input selection circuit) are opened, enabling P k to reconstruct this input and do consistence check by comparing the input with its random input. If the reconstructed input value does not equal to its random input value, P k aborts; otherwise, P k uncommits to T j i [n k−1 + 1..n k ]. This forces the corrupted party to follow the protocol to select random inputs for computation verification.
Third, for each run with c (j) = 1, each party P k uncommits its internal state share T Our detailed protocol is demonstrated in Fig. 6 .
Security Analysis
In this section, we first show that the three-party commitment scheme in Fig.  4 is perfectly binding and perfectly hiding, and then show that our protocol is information-theoretically secure against one malicious corruption. Theorem 2 states the security of the commitment shceme π com (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ).
Theorem 2. Protocol π com (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ) is of perfect binding and perfect hiding in the presence of a malicious adversary corrupting at most one of the parties.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that P 1 is the committer and P 2 , P 3 are verifiers. Then, we consider the cases where P 1 is corrupted and where P 2 is corrupted. (the cases of P 2 and P 3 are essentially symmetric). -Select proper inputs: For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}: For j ∈ {1, · · · , s}: For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
n . The input bits {xj}s can be regarded as an n × s bit matrix. Letting vw ∈ {0, 1} s (w ∈ {1, · · · , n}) denote the wth column of the matrix input to input wire w, the input can be written as {vw}n. The circuit with s copies of inputs can be computed in parallel as follows. For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}: For j ∈ {1, · · · , s}:
If g is AND gate (see Fig. 3 ): For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}: For j ∈ {1, · · · , s}:
.n] corresponding to input wires -P k commits to T 
, and checks if the circuit computation is correct. If any error is found, P k aborts. -Construct outputs:
For j ∈ {1, · · · , s}: If c (j) = 0 then: For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
, 2, 3}:
For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}: P k checks if all yj with c (j) = 0 are equal. If not so, aborts; otherwise, output any yj with c (j) = 0 as the common output. If P 1 is corrupted, the honest verifiers P 2 and P 3 will hold two shares of the committed data d, which will uniquely determine d due to Shamir's secret sharing, and P 1 cannot open the commitment to any other value except the original value committed in the uncommitment phase. Thus, perfect binding holds.
If P 2 is corrupted, it receives a share of d in the commitment phase, which is a uniformly random number in F p and carries no information about d. Thus the perfect hiding holds.
The Theorem 3 states the security of our 3PC protocol with malicious security.
Theorem 3. Protocol π mal 3PC (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ) is secure in the presence of a malicious adversary corrupting at most one of the parties, and achieves a cheating probability 2 −s where s is the statistical parameter.
Proof. Given that the commitment scheme π com (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ) is of perfect binding and perfect hiding, it is obvious that all the messages caused by commitments can be perfectly simulated, and the commitment data cannot be changed once it is committed. Thus, in the simulation following, we omit the simulation of mes-sages caused by commitments, and use the three-party commitment protocol as an ideal functionality. Since the three parties are symmetric in the protocol, we consider only the case where P 1 is corrupted. We show that the real and simulated interactions are indistinguishable to all environments, in every part of the protocol. Recall that the view of an environment consists of messages sent from honest parties to the corrupted party, as well as the final outputs of the parties.
-Input sharing. In this phase, P 1 receives [I 2 ] 1 from honest P 2 , and [I 3 ] 1 from honest P 3 . This can be simulated with two uniformly random bit string of the same bit lengths as the two received messages. Specifically, message
] 1 )) can be simulated with a random string t 1 ∈ {0, 1} 
] 1 )) can be simulated with a random string t 2 ∈ {0, 1} s|x 0 3 | . Due to the XOR secret sharing used, the real and simulated views are identically distributed.
-Circuit computation. This phase comprises two steps:
• Select proper inputs. 
] 3 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {1, · · · , s}. These messages are all uniformly random strings for P 1 , except that [x ] 3 had been generated by P 1 and thus [t 1,j ] 3 is known exactly to P 1 . Therefore, these messages can be simulated with strings t 1 ∈ R {0, 1} ns , t 2 ∈ R {0, 1} s and t 3 ∈ R {0, 1} ns , respectively, with a restraint that substrings [t 1,j ] 3 are fixed in the correponding places of t 1 . This way, the real and simulated views of all environments are identical.
• Compute the circuit.
This can be simulated gate by gate until the computation is completed. Given a current gate, it is simulated in terms of its operation as follows. * XOR: Party P i sends or receives nothing, so there is nothing to be simulated. * AND: Let a, b ∈ {0, 1} s denote the two input bit strings to the gate. Let r i , r h(i−1) ∈ {0, 1} s be the two uniformly random bit strings generated by P i and P h(i−1) for the AND computation, respectively. During the gate computation, P i receives [b] k . Thus, the three messages can again be simulated by three uniformly random bit strings. Both the real and simulated views are also identical. Thus, the entire phase of circuit computation can be perfectly simulated.
-Transcript commitment. This phase can be perfectly simulated due to the perfect hiding of the commitment scheme. -Output generation. This phase make sure that any deviation from the protocol can be detected except with negligible probability in statistical pa-rameter s, making use of the perfect binding of the commitment scheme used.
• Construct cut-and-choose indicator:
The protocol either open the shares correctly, and thus all parties can construct c, or is aborted for some cheating detected. Namely, once all the shares of c is committed, they cannot be modifed in all runs of computation.
• Check random inputs: The protocol either properly selects the random inputs as inputs to runs for computation verification, or is aborted for some cheating detected. This makes sure that all runs for computation verification should use random inputs, otherwise the protocol will be aborted and noting is revealed.
• Verify circuit computation: The protocol either successfully verify the correctness of all the runs for computation verification, or is aborted for some cheating detected. This makes sure all runs for computation verification are correctly performed.
• Construct output: The protocol either correctly constructs the outputs, or is aborted for some cheating detected. This makes sure that all runs for output computation are consistently performed.
From the above, we can see that for semi-honest adversaries, the protocol would be carried out successfully; for malicious adversaries, any cheating would be caught except with a negligible probability and the protocol would be aborted. In a word, all environments' real and simulated views are indistinguishable.
To cheat successfully, the adversary has to guess the value of c, thus the cheating probability is 2 −s .
Efficiency Discussion
Now we discuss the efficiency of the proposed protocol. The computation complexity is mild since there are no cryptographic operations, and most of the operations are bitwise XOR and AND computations. The communication complexity is reduced compared to the counterparts based on verifiable secret sharing. Specifically, the communication round amounts to the depth of the circuit plus a constant number, while that of the protocols based on verifiable secret sharing may be several times of the circuit depth.
Practical Considerations of Our Protocol
In practical scenarios, malicious security may be much stronger than actual security demand. For example, if a protocol ensuring that 99.5% of all cheatings are caught is sufficient for practical applications, the a covert security level fixing s = 8 can be used, and the protocol is converted into covertly secure one with deterrent 1−2 −8 . In other words, we can fix s properly at a small value according to practical requirements, and get a protocol with appropriate deterrent.
Furthermore, at most of the time in practice, computational security is enough. Thus, the unifromly random bits can be generated by a pseudo-random generator, and the commitments to the transcripts of s runs can be replaced with the commitments to hash values of the transcripts, degrading the original information-theoretically secure protocol to a computationally secure one, but with a better efficiency.
Conclusion
In this work, we apply cut-and-choose idea in the information-theoretic setting to construct a maliciously secure protocol for three-party computations (3PC) with one corruption. This yields an efficient and information-theoretically secure 3PC protocol for Boolean circuit computation. Asymptotically, we achieve a cheating probability of 2 −s where s is the number of runs of circuit computation. This is similar to the setting where cut-and-choose technique is used based on Yao's garbled circuits [Lin13] .
